WHEN THE NEXT ATTACK OCCURS: IS INDIA’S LEGAL AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM PREPARED?

Introduction

On June 9, 2024, in Reasi, Jammu & Kashmir, a terror group affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba ambushed a pilgrim bus. In the attack, nine people died, and more than forty were injured when the bus sped down the mountain into a gorge.[1]

Within a year, on April 22, 2025, five gunmen in Baisaran Valley, Pahalgam, executed another deadly assault against a tourist group, this time killing twenty-six people. Neither of these attacks is an isolated event, but they do signal a much larger development in terrorism now decentralised, digitally enabled, and ideologically networked.[2]

What India is facing now is not a return to the militancy of the 1990s. Threats facing India are becoming more sophisticated, borderless and unpredictable, from state-sponsored disinformation and phishing campaigns that are facilitated by APT36 through websites like CMMI, and home-grown AI-generated propaganda, to a transnational financial network.[3] But India’s legal, intelligence, and security architectures remain unfixed, highly fragmented and functionally isolated. India needs a complete overhaul of both its legal design and institutional framework.

The Intelligence Gap

India’s intelligence agencies, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), National Investigation Agency (NIA), and National Security Guard (NSG) are doing a commendable job at counter-terrorism. For example, the NIA achieved a 100% conviction rate in 25 terror cases in 2024, in addition to enhancing legacy inter-agency issues such as training.[4]

However, structural deficiencies remain:

•        Siloed agencies: RAW focuses on foreign intelligence; IB is concerned with domestic security threats; NIA investigates complex cases; and NSG investigates – none of the agencies collaborates, nor is there any command structure or communications grid to blend cyber, financial and live field intelligence in real-time.[5]                                                                         Technology gap: Foreign actors are using encrypted channels, drones, and AI tools to devise threats. Many local police units still operate antiquated procedures that delay response and safety and squander opportunities to mitigate viable threats.[6]

•        Delayed deployment: In the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the NSG took over 10 hours to deploy due to some logistical obstacles. Despite the establishment of regional hubs, a very large proportion of the national territory remains inadequately secured.[7]

Legal Loopholes

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) is India’s main anti-terror law. However, its undefined terms and low conviction rates reveal serious deficiencies. Between 2016–2020, more than 24,000 people were charged under the UAPA, with only 212 convictions at a rate of about 2.5%.[8]

Courts have repeatedly stated that they worry about undefined terms, including “terrorist act” and the vast powers given to investigative agencies, particularly after the amendments of 2008. [9]Indian anti-terror laws are also siloed The UAPA deals with terrorism, the Information Technology Act governs cybercrimes, illicit finance is covered under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), and hate speech is covered by the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This segmented approach to the law is ineffective against hybrid threats that are not so easily confined by concrete categories.

Witness Protection

In NHRC v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court lamented that a fair trial becomes impossible when witnesses are intimidated. Despite this, India still lacks a statutory Witness Protection Act. The 2018 Witness Protection Scheme, though approved by the Supreme Court, remains a policy directive and lacks binding force.[10]

Digital Evidence and the 65B Problem

Another major obstacle is the treatment of electronic records in the court of law. In Anvar P.V. v. Basheer, the Supreme Court emphasised that all electronic evidence is subject to a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.[11] This decision was affirmed in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, so certification pursuant to 65B is now obligatory. Without that certificate, the entire digital evidence, chat logs, e-mails and phone traces are rendered inadmissible and often fatal to a prosecution.[12]

Learning from Global Models: When it comes to legislation of this nature, the UK and the US have both implemented comprehensive framework regimes that incorporate intelligence sharing, money-laundering provisions, and protections for individual civil liberties. The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, 2019 (UK) brings together laws regarding the use of cyber, border and financial surveillance in one place.[13] The USA PATRIOT Act permits agencies to share intelligence across jurisdictions and empower their machines to undertake surveillance, with accountability to the individual protections afforded by civil liberties.[14]

India cannot assume it can legislate in a silo when the threats it faces are across platforms, sectors, and all equally synchronised towards the same common goal of one or more criminal offences.

What Needs to Change

India’s fight against terror is hampered not just by outdated laws, but by systems that fail to evolve with the threat.

Legal Reforms

1. Speedy Digital Terror Courts: Courts that will be adjudicating terror cases should also have forensic labs, as well as judges who are trained in dealing with digital evidence. And the cases should also be time-bound; no more than two years must elapse; they can use the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2024 as an example.[15]

2. Single Counter-Terrorism Law: A single statute should be a statute that integrates the UAPA, PMLA, ITA, IPC provisions, so that we had a single law that was capable of responding to these threats over time without having to worry about whether we could fit evidence into one of the laws, or lack of evidence. Judicial review within 48 hours of arrest. Parliamentary and judicial oversight over surveillance and detentions. A graded classification of offences based on threat levels.[16]

3. Statutory Witness Protection: The 2018 Scheme must be transformed into enforceable law, offering provisions for relocation, anonymity, and financial protection, especially in high-profile terror cases.[17]

Intelligence and Infrastructure Reforms

1. Functional National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC): Proposed in 2012 but stalled due to federal concerns, a revamped NCTC under cooperative federalism should unite RAW, IB, NIA, and state intelligence wings on a single platform. NATGRID integration can allow agencies to access data in real time.[18]

2. Regional NSG and SIT deployment: NSGs and SITs should be set up at tier-2 and tier-3 cities with rapid mobility infrastructure so they can deploy within two hours to any location in India.[19]

3. AI-enabled surveillance with safeguards: AI-enabled threat detection can thwart attacks before they are executed.[20]

4. However, surveillance must respect privacy under Article 21 as per Justice S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. Any surveillance regime must follow the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.[21]

Conclusion

India cannot keep fighting tomorrow’s terror with yesterday’s tools. Laws that ignore digital finance, or ignore encrypted propaganda, do not merely fall short; they fall behind. The demand is not for more power, but smarter coordination. Systemic coherence, not just legislative expansion, is what the moment calls for.

This is not merely a national security issue, it is a generational one. Citizens, jurists, and law students must be trained to interpret the Constitution in the context of digital threats, borderless actors, and AI-driven crimes. Nations like Israel and the US have already made national security literacy a part of their governance models. India must do the same, not to militarise civilian life, but to democratise security frameworks.[22]

[1] ‘Reasi Terror Attack: 9 Dead, 41 Injured as Pilgrim Bus Shot at by Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir’ The Hindu (New Delhi, 10 June 2024) https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jammu-and-kashmir/reasi-terror-attack-pilgrim-bus-article/article68092084.ece  accessed 11 July 2025.

[2] ‘Pahalgam Massacre: 26 Tourists Killed by Gunmen in Valley Attack’ Indian Express (New Delhi, 23 April 2025) https://indianexpress.com/article/pahalgam-tourist-shooting-april-2025  accessed 11 July 2025.

[3] Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), ‘Advisory on APT36 Using Spoofed CMMI Website for Credential Harvesting’ (March 2024) https://www.cert-in.org.in accessed 11 July 2025.

[4] National Investigation Agency, ‘Annual Press Release – Conviction Records 2024’ (NIA, January 2025) https://nia.gov.in/reports/2024-convictions.pdf  accessed 11 July 2025

[5] Manoj Joshi, ‘The Gaps in India’s Counter-Terrorism Architecture’ Observer Research Foundation (ORF, 2021) https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-gaps-in-indias-counter-terrorism-architecture  accessed 11 July 2025.

[6] Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme’ (Annual Report 2023–24) https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport2023.pdf  accessed 11 July 2025.

[7] Praveen Swami, ‘Why India’s NSG Took Ten Hours to Reach Mumbai in 2008’ The Hindu (New Delhi, 2 December 2008) https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-indias-nsg-took-ten-hours/article13964279.ece  accessed 11 July 2025

[8] Ministry of Home Affairs, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1768: UAPA Conviction Data 2016–2020 (9 February 2021) https://loksabha.nic.in  accessed 12 July 2025.

[9] Human Rights Watch, Stifling Dissent: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in India (2020) https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/07/20/stifling-dissent  accessed 12 July 2025.

[10] NHRC v State of Gujarat (2009) 6 SCC 767.

[11] Supreme Court of India, In Re: Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 (2018) 18 SCC 186.

[12] Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473.

[13] Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1.

[14] Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (UK) https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/3/contents/enacted  accessed 12 July 2025.

[15] The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2024 (India); Ministry of Law and Justice Notification, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 1, 12 January 2024.

[16] Law Commission of India, Report No. 243: Proposal for Reforms in the Terror Laws in India (2012) https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report243.pdf accessed 12 July 2025.

[17] Supreme Court of India, In Re: Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 (2018) 18 SCC 186; Ministry of Home Affairs, Witness Protection Scheme 2018 https://mha.gov.in accessed 12 July 2025.

[18] Ministry of Home Affairs, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Concept Note (2012); see also National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) https://www.natgrid.gov.in accessed 12 July 2025.

[19] Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2022–23 (NSG Deployment Strategy and Expansion) https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/MHAAnnualReport2022-23.pdf  accessed 12 July 2025.

[20] NITI Aayog, National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence #AIForAll (2018) https://niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-01/NationalStrategy-for-AI-Discussion-Paper.pdf accessed 12 July 2025.

[21] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.

[22] Israeli Ministry of Public Security, National Resilience Program (2022); United States Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence (2019) https://www.dhs.gov/publication/strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-and-targeted-violence  accessed 12 July 2025.